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Abstract—In many envisioned mobile ad hoc networks, nodes
are expected to periodically beacon to advertise their presence.
In this way, they can receive messages addressed to them
or participate in routing operations. Yet, these beacons leak
information about the nodes and thus hamper their privacy. A
classic remedy consists in each node making use of (certified)
pseudonyms and changing its pseudonym in specific locations
called mix zones. Of course, privacy is then higher if the
pseudonyms are short-lived (i.e., nodes have a short distance
to confusion), but pseudonyms can be costly, as they are usually
obtained from an external authority. In this paper, we provide
a detailed analytical evaluation of the age of pseudonyms based
on differential equations. We corroborate this model by a set
of simulations. This paper thus provides a detailed quantitative
framework for selecting the parameters of a pseudonym-based
privacy system in peer-to-peer wireless networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually all deployed wireless networks require mobile
nodes to communicate in a single hop with the (wired)
infrastructure, typically through a base station or an access
point. However, the growing popularity of Bluetooth, WiFi
in ad hoc mode, and other similar techniques are likely to
fuel the adoption of peer-to-peer wireless communications. In
that case, wireless nodes communicate directly with each other
over a single hop or over multiple hops. This capability can be
used to support a number of applications, ranging from urban
sensing to mobile social networks to vehicular ad hoc networks
(VANET). Of course, peer-to-peer wireless communications
can coexist with the aforementioned classic wireless networks.
In this paper, we focus exclusively on the former.
In most peer-to-peer wireless communication systems, each
node is expected to periodically beacon to advertise its pres-
ence. In this way, it can receive messages addressed to it
or participate in routing operations. Yet, these beacons leak
information about the node and thus hamper its privacy. In
particular, external parties can monitor beacons to learn the
locations of mobile nodes.
A classic remedy to protect the location privacy of mobile
nodes consists in relying on multiple pseudonyms: a node uses
a pseudonym for a while, then discards it and makes use of
a new one. This requires each node to have a repository of
pseudonyms that it refills whenever needed. In many cases,
these pseudonyms are used by other entities (e.g., other nodes)
as trustworthy identifiers for authentication and thus need to
be certified by a trusted certification authority. The pseudonym
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mechanism must thus be designed with great care, because
information about the identity of the node can potentially
be leaked at various protocol layers, notably by the IP and
MAC address [13]. But even with these precautions, chang-
ing pseudonyms from time to time might not be enough,
because the adversary can track mobile nodes spatially and
temporally [2]. As a consequence, nodes should change their
pseudonyms in a coordinated fashion with their neighbors
in mix zones [4]. In other words, location privacy cannot
be achieved by itself and requires a collective effort from
neighboring mobile nodes.
The age of a pseudonym refers to the time period over which
a given pseudonym is used. Of course, privacy is higher if
the pseudonyms are short-lived. Yet, pseudonyms are costly,
as they are usually obtained from an external authority and
because a change of pseudonym is a burden for a node: that
change can mean remaining unreachable for a short while
(typically during the sojourn in the mix zone), entailing the
loss of ongoing transactions, or requiring the update of routing
tables. Consequently, in many cases a node might consider that
its level of privacy is still high enough and might prefer to not
change its pseudonym, even if it is located in a mix zone.
The coordination of pseudonym changes among nodes
with different privacy levels is thus a central problem to
achieve location privacy with multiple pseudonyms. Several
approaches [4], [6], [11], [12], [14], [21] make use of an
infrastructure or rely on pre-determined time/location to coor-
dinate the pseudonym changes of mobile nodes. However, such
solutions require the help of the infrastructure or that mobile
nodes learn prior to entering the network the location of mix
zones. Several researchers [10], [20], [21], [23] advocate the
use of a distributed solution, where mobile nodes coordinate
pseudonym changes to dynamically obtain mix zones. This
solution is particularly appealing to mobile ad hoc networks
because it does not require the help of the infrastructure.
In a distributed setting, it remains unclear how successful
nodes will be in coordinating their pseudonym changes and
how it will affect the age of their pseudonyms. Most existing
evaluations do not model the dynamics of the system and
consequently do not provide critical conditions for the success
of the multiple pseudonym approach. In this paper, we push
this distributed approach further and provide a framework for
analytically evaluating the privacy obtained with mix zones.
That framework captures the mobility of the nodes and the
evolution of their privacy level over time. It provides designers
with conditions for the emergence of location privacy in
mobile ad hoc networks. We validate our analytical results
with simulations.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section II
contains a detailed model of the considered system. Section III
is focused on the analytical model, expressed in differential
equations, the solution of which is provided in Section IV.
The simulations corroborating these results are provided in
Section V. Finally, Section VI contains a discussion of the
related work and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the assumptions made through-
out the paper.
A. Network Model
We study a network where mobile nodes are autonomous
entities equipped with WiFi or Bluetooth-enabled devices that
communicate with each other upon coming into radio range.
In other words, we consider a mobile wireless system such as
a vehicular network or a network of directly communicating
hand-held devices. Without loss of generality, we assume that
each user in the system has a single mobile device and thus
corresponds to a single node in the network.
As commonly assumed in such networks, we consider an
offline central authority (CA) run by an independent trusted
third party that manages, among other things, the security and
privacy of the network. In line with the multiple pseudonym
approach, we assume that prior to joining the network, every
mobile node in {ui}Ni=1, where N is the total number of
mobile nodes in the system, registers with the CA that preloads
a finite set of pseudonyms (e.g., certified public/private key
pairs, MAC addresses). Mobile nodes change pseudonyms
in mix zones in order to achieve location privacy. Upon
changing pseudonyms, we consider for simplicity that the old
pseudonym expires and is removed from the node’s memory.
Once a mobile node has used all its pseudonyms, it contacts
the CA to obtain a new set of pseudonyms.
We assume that mobile nodes automatically exchange in-
formation (unbeknownst to their users) as soon as they are in
communication range. Note that our evaluation is independent
of the communication protocol. Without loss of generality,
we assume that mobile nodes advertise their presence by
periodically broadcasting proximity beacons containing the
node’s identifying information (i.e., the sender attaches its
pseudonym to its messages). Due to the broadcast nature
of wireless communications, beacons enable mobile nodes to
discover their neighbors. For example, when a node receives
an authenticated beacon, it controls the legitimacy of the
sender by checking the certificate of the public key of the
sender. After that, the node verifies the signature of the beacon
message.
We consider a discrete time system with initial time t = 0.
At each time step t, each mobile node can move independently
of others on a plane in the considered area. We consider
a random-trip mobility model characterized by the rate of
encounters η, and the average number of nodes met in an
encounter N¯ . The rate η determines the number of encounters
with nearby nodes that occur on average. The average N¯
establishes the average number of nodes that participate in
each encounter. The meeting rate η and the average N¯ depend
on nodes’ speed and the topology of the underlying road
network. In our simulations, we consider a random walk
model [7] satisfying predetermined η and N¯ values.
B. Threat Model
An adversary A aims at tracking the location of some
mobile nodes. In practice, the adversary can be a rogue
individual, a set of malicious mobile nodes, or might even
deploy its own infrastructure (e.g., by placing eavesdropping
devices in a given area). We assume that the adversary is
passive and simply eavesdrops on communications. In the
worst case, A obtains complete coverage and tracks mobile
nodes throughout the entire area. We characterize the latter
type of adversary as global.
A collects identifying information (e.g., the MAC address
or the public keys used to sign messages) from the entire
network and obtains location traces that allow him to track
the location of mobile nodes. The problem we tackle in this
paper consists in protecting the location privacy of mobile
nodes, that is, in preventing other parties from learning a
node’s past and current location [4]. It must be noted that,
at the physical layer, the wireless transceiver has a wireless
fingerprint that the adversary could use to identify it [5], [9],
[15], [24]. However, this requires a costly installation for the
adversary and stringent conditions on the wireless medium;
in addition, countermeasures could be developed. Hence, it
remains unclear how much identifying information can be
extracted in practice from the physical layer and we do not
consider this threat. Finally, note that higher layer defenses
such as mix zones can be useful whether or not physical layer
attacks are in place. For example, some applications may need
to store location data to do congestion analysis.
C. Location Privacy Model
There are several techniques to mitigate the tracking of
mobile nodes. In this paper, we consider the use of multiple
pseudonyms: mobile nodes change over time their pseudonym
to reduce their long term linkability.
1) Mix Zones: Mobile nodes in proximity of each other
coordinate pseudonym changes in regions called mix zones
in order to avoid temporal correlation of their locations. Mix
zones can also conceal the trajectory of mobile nodes in order
to protect against the spatial correlation of location traces,
e.g., by using (i) silent mix zones [20], [23], (ii) a mobile
proxy [25], (iii) regions where the adversary has no cover-
age [6], or (iv) encrypted communications [11]. Without loss
of generality, we assume silent mix zones: mobile nodes turn
off their transceivers and stop sending messages for a certain
period of time. If at least two nodes change pseudonyms in a
silent mix zone, a mixing of their whereabouts occurs and the
mix zone becomes a confusion point for the adversary.
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Consider a group of n(t) mobile nodes at time t that are
in proximity. One node among the n(t) nodes can initiate a
change of pseudonym using the one-round protocol suggested
in [23] (i.e., the Swing protocol): a mobile node broadcasts
an initiation message to start the pseudonym change. The
n(t) − 1 mobile nodes in proximity receive the message and
enter a silent period during which they decide whether to
change their pseudonyms or not. During the silent period,
nodes do not communicate with each other. At the end of
the silent period, it appears as if all pseudonym changes have
occurred simultaneously. Mobile nodes must thus decide to
change pseudonyms without knowing the decision of other
nodes in proximity.
The adversary A observes the set of n(T ) nodes changing
pseudonyms, where T is the time at which the pseudonym
change occurs. A compares the set B of pseudonyms before
the change with the set R of pseudonyms after the change
and, based on the mobility of the nodes, predicts the most
probable matching [4], [23]. Let pr|b = Pr(“Pseudonym r ∈
R corresponds to b ∈ B”), that is the probability that a new
pseudonym r ∈ R corresponds to an old pseudonym b ∈ B.
As usually done in the literature [26], the uncertainty of the
adversary (or the untraceability of node ui using pseudonym
b) is defined as:
Ai(T ) = −
n(T )∑
r=1
pr|b log2(pr|b) (1)
The achievable location privacy depends on both the number of
nodes n(T ) and the mobility of the nodes pr|b in the mix zone.
If a node ui changes its pseudonym alone, then the adversary
can track node ui, and we write Ai(T ) = 0. The entropy
is maximum for a uniform probability distribution pr|b and
the achievable location privacy after a coordinated pseudonym
change at time T is upperbounded by log2(n(T )). If at least
two mobile nodes (including ui) change their pseudonyms,
then the pseudonym change is successful and generates a
confusion point. We denote T `i the time of the last successful
pseudonym change of node ui.
2) Distance to Confusion or the Age of Pseudonyms: As
observed in [19], the degree of location privacy not only
depends on the location privacy achieved in mix zones by
the nodes traversing it, but also on how long an adversary can
successfully track mobile nodes between mix zones. A longer
tracking period increases the likelihood that the adversary
identifies the mobile nodes. Hence, mobile nodes should
evaluate the distance over which they are potentially tracked by
an adversary (i.e., the distance to confusion [17]) and act upon
it by deciding to change pseudonyms accordingly. To capture
the notion of distance to confusion, we define the age of a
pseudonym as the time period over which a given pseudonym
is used.
In this work, we model the evolution of the age of
pseudonyms over time Zi(t) for each mobile node ui as a
linearly increasing function of time with an aging rate λi:
Zi(t) = λi · (t− T `i ) (2)
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Fig. 1. Example of evolution of the age of pseudonyms. At t1, node
ui successfully changes pseudonym with another node and the age of its
pseudonym drops to zero. The age of pseudonym of node ui then increases
with rate λ. At t2, the pseudonym change fails and node ui pays the cost γ
of changing a pseudonym. At t3, the node refuses to change its pseudonym.
where t is the current time and T `i ≤ t is the time of the last
successful pseudonym change of mobile ui. The value Zi(t)
captures the age of the current pseudonym of user i at time t
(Fig. 1). The aging rate λi mainly depends on the belief of
node ui with respect to the tracking power of the adversary
and on the beaconing rate/range of node ui. The higher the
value of λi is, the faster the pseudonyms age. For simplicity,
we consider that λi = λ, ∀i.
3) Strategies: With this model, mobile nodes request a
pseudonym change when the age of their pseudonym is
considered large and if there are other nodes in proximity.
Nodes in proximity choose to cooperate (C) or defect (D) if
their pseudonym age is large as well. Hence, the success of
a pseudonym change depends on the state of the neighboring
nodes. Asynchronous requests to change pseudonyms might
cause failed attempts to achieve location privacy. Assume that
nc is the number of nodes that cooperate (change pseudonyms)
in a meeting besides ui and that Zi(t−) is the age of ui just
before making its decision. Considering an encounter in a mix
zone at time t, we write for node ui:
If C ∧ (nc > 0),
T `i = t (3)
Zi(t) = 0 (4)
If C ∧ (nc = 0),
Zi(t) = Zi(t−) + γ (5)
If D,
Zi(t) = Zi(t−) (6)
In other words, Zi(t) is reset to 0 when a pseudonym change
is successful. If a node is alone in changing its pseudonym,
then it pays the cost of changing pseudonym γ and in addition,
the age of its pseudonym keeps increasing. The cost γ can be
expressed as: γ = γacq+γrte+γsil, where γacq is the cost of
acquiring new pseudonyms, γrte is the cost of updating routing
tables, and γsil is the cost of remaining silent while traversing
the mix zone. The cost γ is expressed in age units (i.e., time),
causing an increase in the age of pseudonyms. The cost γ
captures the failed opportunity of a pseudonym change and
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TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS.
Symbol Definition
t Time
λ Pseudonym aging rate
γ Cost of changing pseudonym
N Total number of nodes in the system
f(z, t) Probability distribution function of age of pseudonyms at time t
F (z, t) Cumulative distribution function of age of pseudonyms at time t
c(z) Probability of cooperation of mobile nodes with age z
q(t) Probability that at least one node in a meeting at time t cooperates
η Rate of meetings
c¯(t) Probability of cooperation for a randomly selected node at time t
hn Probability that a meeting involves n+ 1 nodes
H(z) Z-transform of hn
T `i Time of last successful pseudonym change for node ui
Zi(t) Age of pseudonym of node ui at time t
N¯ Average number of nodes in a meeting
z Age of pseudonym
θ Threshold for cooperation
is thus an incentive to carefully manage pseudonyms. Finally,
if a node defects, its pseudonym age is unchanged. Figure 1
illustrates how the age of pseudonyms evolves with time in
the case of meetings between several nodes. With this model,
nodes control the distance over which they can be tracked.
Mobile nodes decide when to change pseudonyms next
based on the time of their last successful pseudonym change
T `i . We define ci(z) the probability distribution over the age Zi
that gives the probability of cooperation of each node ui. For
simplicity, we assume that the distribution is the same for all
nodes and we write ci(z) = c(z). Hence, when several nodes
meet, each node decides whether to change its pseudonym
with probability c(z).
D. Metric
We are interested in measuring the success of the multiple
pseudonym approach. Changing a pseudonym is successful
only if it is coordinated with other nodes nearby. Hence,
in order to evaluate the ability of nodes to synchronize, we
measure the distribution of the age of pseudonyms in the
network. We define Z(t) ∼ f(z, t) a random variable that
describes the density of probability for any age z. The CDF
F (z, t) =
∫
z
f(x, t)dx gives the fraction of nodes ui at time
t whose age of pseudonym is Zi(t) ≤ z.
III. ANALYTICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we derive analytically the probability dis-
tribution of the age of pseudonyms, F (z, t). To do so, we
calculate the fraction of users whose age of pseudonyms is
lower than z, i.e. Pr{Z 6 z}. We show that the evolution of
the age of pseudonyms can be approximated by a dynamical
system composed of a simple differential equation when the
number of nodes N gets large. Table I summarizes the notation
used throughout the paper.
A. Dynamical System
As discussed above, the random variable Z(t) models the
distribution of the age of pseudonyms at time t. The evolution
of this random variable over time can be captured by a
dynamical system composed of drift and jump processes. The
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the drift (∆) and jump (Γ1 and Γ2) processes. We
observe the three scenarios causing a change in the distribution F (z, t).
goal of the drift and jump processes is to capture the dynamics
of the age of pseudonyms by modeling the possible variations
of a pseudonym age. The drift models an increase in the age
of the pseudonyms (e.g., aging of a pseudonym), and a jump
models sudden changes in the age of the pseudonyms (e.g.,
upon using a new pseudonym).
1) Drift Process ∆: The drift process models the aging of
pseudonyms over time as shown in Fig. 2. At each time step,
the age of the pseudonym of every node is incremented with
rate λ. Hence, for any fixed value z, the age of the pseudonyms
of a fraction of nodes will pass above z and decrease F (z, t).
The drift directly depends on the aging rate λ and the density
of the age of the pseudonyms:
∆ = λ
∂F
∂z
(7)
2) Jump Process Γ: The jump process captures the sudden
variations in the age of pseudonyms. There are two possible
scenarios, Γ1 and Γ2, that correspond to successful and failed
attempts to change pseudonyms, respectively (Fig. 2). In
the first type of jump Γ1, a node uj with a pseudonym
age larger than z successfully changes its pseudonym with
other encountered nodes in proximity. Hence, the age of its
pseudonym drops to 0. This happens with rate:
Γ1 = η
∫ ∞
0
c(x)q(t)(1− 1{x≤z})∂F
∂x
(x, t)dx (8)
where q(t) is the probability that at least one of the encoun-
tered nodes changes pseudonym as well; c(z) is the probability
of cooperation of user uj given that its age of pseudonym is z,
and η is the rate of meetings scaled by the number of nodes.
Intuitively, Γ1 (i.e., the rate at which any node uj successfully
changes pseudonym) depends on the rate of encounter between
nodes η, on the probability that uj cooperates c(z), on the
probability of meeting a nodes that cooperates q(t), and on
the probability of having a pseudonym age larger than z.
The integral captures the probability that a node uj has a
pseudonym age larger than z, cooperates, and meets at least
one cooperative node, thus causing an increase in F (z).
In the second type of jump process Γ2, a user uk with a
pseudonym age between z − γ and z changes pseudonym in
an encounter with other nodes. However, none of the nodes in
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proximity cooperate, and the pseudonym change is a failure.
Hence a pseudonym is wasted and user uk suffers a cost γ:
Zk(t) = Z−k + γ causing an increase in the number of users
with an age of pseudonym larger than z. This happens with
rate:
Γ2 = η
∫ z
z−γ
c(x)(1− q(t))∂F
∂x
(x, t)dx (9)
Intuitively, Γ2 (i.e., the rate at which uk fails to change
pseudonyms) depends on the rate of encounter η, on the
probability that uk cooperates, on the probability of meeting
nodes that all defect (1− q(t)), and on the probability that uk
has a pseudonym age in the interval [z − γ, z]. The integral
captures the probability that a node uk has a pseudonym age
in the interval [z − γ, z], cooperates, and meets nodes that all
defect, thus causing a decrease in F (z).
B. Differential Equation
Taking into account the drift and jump processes, we
obtain a dynamical system defined by a single differential
equation. The cumulative distribution function F (z, t), giving
the fraction of nodes with an age of pseudonym smaller than
z, is the unique solution of the following differential equation:
∂F
∂t
= −∆+ Γ1 − Γ2 (10)
with boundary conditions: F (∞, t) = 1, ∀t. Intuitively, on one
hand, the drift ∆ and the jump Γ2 cause nodes to have an age
larger than z, hence decreasing the fraction of nodes F (z).
For this reason, they are subtracted from ∂F∂t . On the other
hand, the jump Γ1 increases the number of nodes on the left
size of z, hence increasing F (z). For this reason, it is added
to ∂F∂t .
As defined above, q(t) is the probability that at least one
of the encountered nodes cooperates. It can be calculated
by considering the probability of meeting n nodes and the
probability that at least one node cooperates:
q(t) = 1−
∑
n≥0
hn(1− c¯(t))n = 1−H(1− c¯(t)) (11)
where hn is the probability of meeting n nodes (a meeting
involves n+ 1 nodes: the node itself with the n encountered
nodes), H(z) =
∑
n>0 z
nhn is the Z-transform of hn, and
c¯(t) is the probability that an encountered node cooperates:
c¯(t) =
∫ ∞
0
c(z)f(z, t)dz (12)
Intuition of the equation above: The main idea of our
approach is to replace all interactions between nodes with an
average interaction. This can be done by using the principles of
Mean Field theory. To do so, we consider the probability that
each node has a certain age in the system (e.g., f(z)). Previous
work [1], [8] has shown that such probability distribution
function converges to a deterministic limit (mean field conver-
gence) when N goes to infinity. The probability distribution
function is known to satisfy an ordinary differential equation
formed by drift and jump processes that capture the possible
transitions in the age of pseudonyms. In summary, by consider-
ing the possible scenarios that affect the age of pseudonyms,
we derive the above differential equation characterizing the
distribution of the age of pseudonyms.
IV. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
In this section, we solve the differential equation (10)
characterizing the age of pseudonyms. We consider the system
in the stationary regime (i.e., as t goes to infinity, we have
∂F
∂t = 0) and evaluate how system parameters such as η, λ,
θ, and c(z) affect the distribution of the age of pseudonyms
F (z, t).
We assume that a node cooperates according to a simple
threshold function. This means that if its age of pseudonym
is smaller than a given threshold θ, it decides not to coop-
erate, whereas it cooperates with probability c0 if its age of
pseudonym is larger than θ:
c(z) =
{
0 z 6 θ
c0 z > θ
(13)
Intuitively, a node will tend not to cooperate as long as it
estimates that the age of its pseudonym (or its distance to
confusion) is sufficient. With this model, the threshold θ and
the probability c0 determine the inclination of each node
to cooperate. For example, a low θ and a high c0 mean
that the nodes will often change their pseudonyms. These
parameters directly affect the probability distribution of the age
of pseudonyms. Consequently, we can fine tune the achievable
level of privacy in the system.
As mentioned, we have ∂F∂t = 0 in the stationary regime.
For simplicity, we derive Equation (10) with respect to z and
as ∂F∂z (z, t) = f(z, t), we obtain: λ
∂f
∂z + ηc(z)f(z)− η(1− q)c(z − γ)f(z − γ) = 0∫∞
0
f(z)dz = 1
(14)
Considering the probability of cooperation c(z) defined by
Equation (13), the above differential equation must be solved
in three intervals:
1) z < θ: The probability of cooperation c(z) is equal to 0
in this interval (i.e., nodes never cooperate). Hence the
differential equation (14) becomes ∂f∂z = 0. The solution
is then f(z) = f(0).
2) θ 6 z < θ + γ: The probability of cooperation c(z − γ)
is equal to 0 in this interval and the differential equation
is: λ∂f∂z + ηc0f(z) = 0. Considering the boundary
condition f(z = θ), the solution in this interval is:
f(z) = f(0)e
−ηc0
λ (z−θ).
3) θ + γ 6 z: For these values of z, the differential
equation (14) is a non-autonomous differential equation.
We iteratively solve this differential equation by solving a
series of autonomous differential equations in the interval
[0, γ]. As illustrated in Fig. 3, we define m functions
fm, m = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,∞, over the interval [0, γ]. For each
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Fig. 3. The definition of fm over [θ +mγ, θ + (m+ 1)γ] intervals.
interval, we obtain an autonomous differential equation as
follows:
∂fm(x)
∂x +
ηc0
λ fm(x)− ηc0(1−q)λ fm−1(x) = 0
fm(0) = fm−1(γ) m = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,∞
(15)
In order to ensure the continuity of f(z), we need to
take into account the solution of f(z) in the interval
[θ, θ + γ]. Hence, we know that f0(γ) must be equal
to f(0)e
−ηc0
λ (γ). For m = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,∞, the solution of
the above system of iterative equations is:
fm(x) = e
−ηc0x
λ
(
fm−1(γ) +
ηc0(1− q)
λ
∫ x
0
e
ηc0y
λ fm−1(y)dy
)
(16)
Finally, we obtain the values of f(z) by calculating
fm(z−(θ+mγ)) for every interval [θ+mγ, θ+(m+1)γ].
Let us define α = ηc0/λ for simplicity. After some
simplifications on Equation (16), we obtain:
f(z) =

f(0) z < θ
f(0)e−α(z−θ) θ 6 z < θ + γ
f(0)e−α(z−θ)g(z) θ + γ 6 z
(17)
where g(z) is a polynomial function as follows:
g(z) =
m∑
k=0
αk
k!
ekαγ(1− q)k(z − kγ − θ)k (18)
for θ + mγ ≤ z < θ + (m + 1)γ. Recall that f(0)
can be calculated using the boundary condition presented in
Equation (14). After some simplification, we obtain:
f(0) =
1
θ + 1−e−αγα + I
(19)
where I =
∑∞
m=1
∑m
k=0 e
α(θ+kγ) (1−q)kαk
k!
∫ θ+(m+1)γ
θ+mγ
e−αz(z −
θ − kγ)kdz.
From the above equation, we observe that we need to
calculate probability q (at least one node cooperates at the
meeting point) in order to obtain f(z). To do so, we must
compute probability hn of meeting n nodes and the probability
of cooperation of a node c¯ as shown in Equation (11).
A. Derivation of Probability q
Assume that the average number of nodes in a meeting point
is N¯ . Usually, the probability of having n nodes in a meeting
point follows a long tail distribution. In this paper, we consider
a Geometric distribution with parameter w for the probability
of meeting n nodes. By definition of a Geometric definition,
the average number of nodes at a meeting point is N¯ = w1−w .
The probability of meeting n nodes is then:
hn = wn(1− w) (20)
Hence, the Z-transform of hn is:
H(z) =
∑
n>0
znwn(1− w) = z(1− w)
1− zw (21)
We also need to compute the average probability of coop-
eration c¯. Using Equation (12), we obtain:
c¯ = f(0)c0
(
1− e−αγ
α
+
∫ ∞
θ+γ
e−α(z−θ)g(y)dy
)
= f(0)c0
(
1− e−αγ
α
+ I
)
(22)
Finally, q is obtained by computing H(1− c¯), which is the
value between 0 and 1 that satisfies the following equation:
c0
q
=
1
w
− (1− c0) + θ(1− w)
w(1−e−αγα + I)
(23)
Our results in Equation (17) show that the probability
density function f(z) will first be uniform in the interval
[0, θ]. Then, on the small interval [θ, θ + γ], it will decrease
exponentially. For the other values of z, the probability f(z)
decreases according to an exponential distribution multiplied
by a polynomial g(z). Intuitively, it means that nodes will
be evenly distributed below the threshold θ and for the other
values of z > θ will have a long tail distribution.
With respect to probability q, we observe that it not only
depends on cooperation parameters such as c0 and θ, but
also depends on the rate of encounters η, the average number
of nodes in an encounter N¯ , and on the cost of changing
pseudonym γ.
B. Example with γ = 0 and c0 = 1
Assume that the cost of changing pseudonym γ = 0 and
that c0 = 1. The probability distribution function f(z) can be
rewritten as
f(z) =

f(0) z < θ
f(0)e
−ηq
λ (z−θ) θ 6 z
(24)
where f(0) = 1
θ+ ληq
. We compute q by using Equation (11).
Considering our threshold cooperation function c(z), c¯(t) is:
c¯ =
∫ ∞
θ
f(0)e−
ηq
λ (z−θ)dz =
λ
λ+ ηqθ
(25)
Finally q can be calculated by replacing c¯ in Equation (11):
q =
λ−√λ(4ηθw(1− w) + λ)
2(−1 + w)ηθ (26)
We observe that in this simple example, the probability density
function f(z) is first uniform for z < θ and then decreases
according to an exponential distribution.
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Fig. 4. Probability distribution function f(z) for different values of γ.
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Fig. 5. Probability distribution function f(z) for different values of θ.
C. Numerical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate numerically the analytical results
of the previous section. In particular, we study how the system
parameters affect the distribution of the age of pseudonyms,
f(z). Unless otherwise stated, we use the following values
for the system parameters: N¯ = 0.5, θ = 5, γ = 1, λ = 1,
η = 0.75, and c0 = 1.
As shown in Equation (17), the probability density function
f(z) has three different behaviors: it is first constant with
value f(0), then decreases exponentially with parameter −α
and finally decreases according to an exponential multiplied
by a polynomial which is different for every interval of size
γ. We observe in Fig. 4 the three behaviors of f(z) for
different values of γ. For example, with γ = 4, we have
f(z) = f(0) = 0.09 over the interval [0, θ]. Then, f(z)
exponentially decreases until θ + γ = 9. Finally, we observe
that f(z) oscillates because of the polynomial function (18)
which is different for every interval of size γ. As z increases,
the oscillation is attenuated because the exponential term dom-
inates the polynomial function. Intuitively, the oscillation is
caused by the jump process Γ2: nodes with age of pseudonym
belonging to [z − γ, z] fail to coordinate and their age of
pseudonym is thus increased by γ. In Fig. 4, we also observe
the effect of different values of γ on the distribution f(z). As
γ decreases, the oscillations become less noticeable because
the jump process Γ2 affects fewer nodes (since the interval
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Fig. 6. Probability distribution function f(z) for different values of N¯ .
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Fig. 7. Probability distribution function f(z) for different values of λ.
[z − γ, z] becomes smaller). Moreover, in the case of γ = 0,
we notice that there is no oscillation because Γ2 does not affect
any node. Note that when γ decreases, more nodes have an
age of pseudonym smaller than the threshold θ.
Figure 5 shows the effect of different θ on f(z). We observe
that with larger values of θ, the number of nodes with age of
pseudonym below θ increases. A system designer can thus fine
tune θ to vary the population of nodes with age of pseudonym
smaller than θ. As θ increases, we notice that the average value
of z increases as well, meaning that more nodes have a high
age of pseudonym because nodes are less cooperative.
Figure 6 illustrates the effect of the average number of nodes
N¯ in meetings on f(z). When N¯ increases, the probability
q to find a cooperative node increases and consequently the
number of nodes with age of pseudonym below the threshold
θ increases as well, meaning that in average the age of
pseudonym is smaller.
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of the aging rate λ on f(z).
We observe that with a high λ (i.e., pseudonyms age faster),
fewer nodes have an age of pseudonym below θ compared to
lower values of λ.
Finally, we evaluate the influence of the rate of meetings
η on f(z) in Fig. 8. First, we focus on the probability q
of encountering at least one cooperative node in Fig. 8 (a).
As λ increases, nodes age faster and we observe that their
probability of cooperation increases logarithmically. When the
rate η increases, we observe that the probability of cooperation
7
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
λ
q
(λ
)
η = 0.75
η = 1
η=1.5
η=2
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
z
f
(z
)
η = 0.75
η = 1
η = 1.5
η = 2
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. Influence of the rate of meetings η: (a) Probability q that at least one node in a meeting cooperates. (b) Probability distribution function f(z).
q decreases for any value of λ: the reason is that for larger
values of η, both jump processes Γ1 and Γ2 occur more fre-
quently. Because Γ1 dominates Γ2 (as it affects more nodes),
a larger fraction of nodes will have an age of pseudonym
below θ (Fig. 8 (b)). For this reason, for a high η, fewer nodes
cooperate, and q decreases.
The above results can help a system designer find the condi-
tions for the emergence of location privacy. More specifically,
the system designer can fine tune parameters such as θ, γ and
λ in order to control the number of nodes with large age of
pseudonym.
V. VALIDATION WITH SIMULATIONS
In order to verify the relevance of our model, we compare
our numerical evaluations with simulation results.
A. Simulation Setup
We consider a set of N mobile nodes moving according
to a random walk model. The plane is composed of a grid
of 10km×10km, where each step is of one meter. At every
intersection, mobile nodes move from their current location to
a new location by randomly choosing a direction. We consider
that mobile nodes move with a constant speed. Directions are
chosen out of [0, 2pi] with granularity pi/2.
We consider that nodes are neighbors (i.e., in communica-
tion range) if they are within a fixed perimeter. We consider a
communication range of 100m. Whenever a node has at least
one neighbor, it must decide whether to cooperate or defect
based on its value Zi(t) and the threshold cooperation function
c(z). After each iteration of the simulation, we compare the
average of the current probability density function f(z) to the
average of f(z) obtained in the 50 previous iterations. The
simulation stops if the difference is smaller than 0.005, and
otherwise runs at least for 200 iterations.
B. Simulation Results
Figure 9 compares f(z) obtained with the numerical evalua-
tion to the one obtained by simulation with two different values
of γ = 0 and γ = 4. We consider the same value of η and
N¯ for the analytical and simulation results. The distribution
of age obtained from the model shows a pretty good match
with the distribution obtained with simulations. This means
that our modeling assumptions succeeded in capturing the
collective behavior of nodes changing their pseudonyms in
mobile networks.
VI. RELATED WORK
Previous works on location privacy [3], [18], [22] show
that an adversary can implicitly obtain the true identity of the
owner of a mobile node from the analysis of pseudonymous
location traces. For example, using location traces collected
in an office environment, Beresford and Stajano [3] correctly
identified all participants by simply examining where the
participants spent most of their time. Similarly, using GPS
traces from vehicles, two studies by Hoh et al. [18] and
Krumm [22] found the home (and thus the identity) of most
drivers. Hence, pseudonyms are not sufficient to protect the
location privacy of mobile nodes and should be changed over
time to avoid such attacks. But even if location traces of mobile
nodes do not contain any pseudonyms, Hoh and Gruteser [16]
were able to reconstruct the tracks of mobile nodes using
a multiple target tracking algorithm. Hence, location traces
should also be altered spatially. In other words, the spatial and
temporal correlation between successive locations of mobile
nodes must be carefully eliminated to prevent external parties
from compromising their location privacy. In this paper, loca-
tion privacy is achieved by changing pseudonyms in regions
called mix zones [3].
The coordination of pseudonym changes is thus a central
problem to achieve location privacy with multiple pseudonyms
and various solutions were proposed. One solution [6] consists
in changing pseudonyms at a pre-determined frequency. The
mechanism works if at least two mobile nodes change their
pseudonyms in proximity. Other solutions suggest to use
base stations as coordinators [21], or to change pseudonyms
as specific time instance [14]. Another approach [4], [11],
[12] coordinates pseudonym changes by forcing mobile nodes
to change their pseudonyms within pre-determined regions
called mix zones. Several researchers [10], [20], [21], [23]
advocated the use of a distributed solution, where mobile
nodes coordinate pseudonym changes to dynamically obtain
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Fig. 9. Validation of numerical results: (a) γ = 0. (b) γ = 4.
mix zones. This solution is particularly interesting for mobile
ad hoc networks because it does not require the help of the
infrastructure, nor prior knowledge of the location of mix
zones. In [10], nodes independently decide whether to change
pseudonyms in mix zones. The decisions of the nodes is
modeled with game theory and the authors show that selfish
behavior dramatically decreases the chances of a successful
coordination. However, none of the previous work measures
the coordination success of pseudonym changes and its effect
on the age of pseudonym.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have considered the problem of achieving location
privacy in mobile networks using multiple pseudonyms. We
developed a framework to analytically evaluate the age of
pseudonyms. Our framework captures the mobility and inter-
actions between nodes. With this model, we obtained critical
conditions for the emergence of location privacy. In particular,
we evaluated the importance of the probability of cooperation
of the nodes (θ and c0), their mobility (η and N¯ ), the
cost of pseudonyms γ, and the aging rate λ. The model
matches well with simulations, meaning that our modeling
assumptions succeeded in capturing the collective behavior of
nodes changing their pseudonyms in mobile networks. This
paper is a first step towards obtaining a deeper understanding
of the dynamics of privacy-preserving mechanisms in mobile
networks.
In the future, we plan to consider other probability functions
c(z) for the cooperation of nodes. It would also be interesting
to measure the relation between the level of uncertainty of an
adversary and a given distribution of age of pseudonyms.
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